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Intoxication and the Criminal Law 
by Gareth Griffith 
 
1 Reform proposal 
On 15 October 2008 it was reported 
that, in response to ‘the soaring 
incidence of alcohol-related violence 
across Sydney’, State Cabinet is 
considering changes to the liquor laws 
and also to the criminal law of 
intoxication. Specifically, all pubs, 
clubs and bottle shops would have to 
close at 2 am. The report also said the 
changes would  
 
remove intoxication as a defence or 
a mitigating factor in crime – 
particularly assaults. Instead, 
drunkenness would become an 
‘aggravating factor’ in sentencing… 
 
A Cabinet minute is quoted as saying:  
 
It is incongruous that the criminal 
law still regards intoxication as a 
factor that can lessen culpability for 
violent anti-social behavior.1
 
2 Intoxication and the criminal 
law 
Intoxication can impact on the criminal 
law in a number of ways. These 
include: 
 
2.1 Public drunkenness:  
Public drunkenness is no longer an 
offence in itself in NSW. However, 
under s 206 of the Law Enforcement 
(Powers and Responsibilities) Act 
2002 a person who appears to be 
seriously affected by alcohol or other 
drugs in a public place may be 
detained by police if they are behaving 
in a disorderly manner, are likely to 
cause injury to themselves or 
someone else, or are in need of 
physical protection.  
 
Further, under s 73 of the Liquor Act 
2007 it is an offence for a licensee to 
permit intoxication on licensed 
premises, or for a licensee or an 
employee to sell or supply alcohol to 
an intoxicated person. 
 
2.2 Dangerous driving under the 
influence 
Intoxication can be an element of the 
offence of dangerous driving, 
specifically where a person is found 
guilty of the crimes of ‘dangerous 
driving occasioning death’ or of 
‘dangerous driving occasioning 
grievous bodily harm’ and is ‘under the 
influence of intoxicating liquor or of a 
drug’ (s 52A(1)(a) and s 52A(3)(a)) of 
the Crimes Act 1900).  
 
It is also the case that a defined level 
of intoxication can be an aggravating 
factor, specifically in relation to the 
offences of ‘aggravated dangerous 
driving occasioning death’ and 
‘aggravated dangerous driving 
occasioning grievous bodily harm’ (ss 
52A(2) and (4) read with s 52A(7) of 
the Crimes Act 1900). In R v Jurisic 
(1998) 45 NSWLR 209 a guideline 
judgment was handed down for the 
sentencing of offences of dangerous 
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driving. Aggravating factors were said 
to include ‘Degree of intoxication or of 
substance abuse’.  
 
The offences of dangerous driving are 
ones of strict liability, which means that 
the prosecution is not required to 
prove any mens rea (a guilty mind or 
criminal intention). 
 
2.3 Knowledge about consent in 
sexual assault offences 
In 2007, s 61HA was inserted into the 
Crimes Act 1900 for the purpose of 
defining what is meant by ‘consent’ in 
sexual assault offences. In determining 
the issue of knowledge about consent, 
the judge or jury (as the case may be) 
is directed not to have regard to the 
self-induced intoxication of the 
accused. In the relevant Second 
Reading speech it was said: 
 
The reference to the exclusion of 
self-induced intoxication as a 
relevant circumstance simply 
replicates the current provisions in 
Division 11A of the Crimes Act 1900 
in relation to intoxication. It serves 
as an important reminder that self-
induced intoxication cannot be taken 
into account in relation to the mens 
rea for these sexual assault 
offences.2  
 
It is also the case that self-induced 
intoxication is to be disregarded for the 
purpose of the defence of substantial 
impairment by abnormality of mind (s 
23A(3), Crimes Act 1900). 
 
3 Intoxication as a mitigating or 
aggravating factor in 
sentencing 
The relevance of intoxication for the 
determination of the guilt or non-guilt 
of a person is set out under Part 11A 
of the Crimes Act 1900. This is 
discussed below. Distinct from that is 
the potential relevance of intoxication 
for sentencing purposes. Under s 21A 
of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) 
Act 1999 various aggravating and 
mitigating factors to be taken into 
account are listed. However, these are 
not exhaustive of all the factors that 
may be taken into account by the 
Court, with s 21A(1)(c) permitting 
account to be taken of ‘any other 
objective or subjective factor that 
affects the relative seriousness of the 
offence’. The point to make is that, 
even where intoxication is deemed 
inadmissible by Part 11A, it may still 
be relevant at the sentencing stage, 
either as a mitigating or aggravating 
factor, on an objective or subjective 
basis. For example, the Sentencing 
Bench Book [10.480] states: 
 
The degree of deliberation 
manifested by the offender is usually 
a matter to be taken into account in 
the sentencing process. Intoxication 
at the time of the offence is often a 
relevant consideration in 
determining the degree of 
deliberation involved. It may, for 
example, aggravate the crime 
because of the recklessness with 
which the offender became 
intoxicated and proceeded to carry 
out the crime; or it may mitigate the 
crime because the offender has, by 
reason of that intoxication, acted out 
of character: R v Coleman (1990) 47 
A Crim R 306 at 327 per Hunt J; R v 
Jerrard (1991) 56 A Crim R 297 per 
Finlay J at 301–302. 
 
4 Intoxication as a ‘defence’ 
 
Strictly speaking, in terms of the 
determination of guilt or non-guilt, 
intoxication is not in fact a ‘defence’ in 
criminal proceedings. Rather, it is ‘a 
factual matter which bears upon the 
existence or non-existence of an 
ingredient of the offence’.3 Intoxication 
may negate the elements of a crime if 
it causes a condition inconsistent with 
criminal responsibility. That is, at 
common law evidence of intoxication 
may be used by the defence to support 
a claim that:  
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• the criminal conduct was 
performed involuntarily; or 
• the conducted was not intended 
or the accused did not have the 
requisite mens rea for the 
offence.4 
 
4.1 Voluntariness and intention 
At common law, therefore, evidence of 
intoxication may be used by the 
defence to establish that the person 
did not act voluntarily, thus negativing 
the actus reus of the offence. Evidence 
of intoxication can also be used for the 
purpose of negativing mens rea. 
 
The actus reus refers to the act (either 
a positive act or an omission to act) as 
defined by the offence, that is required 
to attract criminal liability. The 
defendant’s act or conduct must be 
voluntary (that is, the product of the 
will or the conscious mind) for criminal 
liability to be inferred. The question 
raised by intoxication (self-induced or 
otherwise) is whether the criminal act 
was performed in a state of impaired 
consciousness and therefore could not 
be defined as voluntary. 
 
A second element of a criminal 
responsibility is the mens rea (the 
guilty mind) of the accused.5 The 
mens rea of most serious crimes is 
generally expressed as an intention to 
bring about the requisite actus reus of 
the offence. Without the requisite 
intention, it is argued, the accused 
cannot be guilty of a criminal offence. 
The question is whether a state of 
intoxication can be said to prevent the 
formation of the required intent.  
 
4.2 The public policy debate 
Complex issues arise, of a technical 
nature relating to the criminal law and 
of public policy. In terms of the public 
policy debate, the views of Parliaments 
and the public generally may be in 
marked contrast to those of the courts, 
law reform bodies and the like. The 
broad public view is that offenders 
should not be acquitted of violent and 
other crimes simply because they 
acted when in a state of self-induced 
intoxication. On the other side, those 
more concerned with the purity of legal 
principles have tended to argue in the 
opposite direction, taking the view that 
letting the occasional defendant 
escape the criminal net is a ‘small 
price for keeping away any alternative 
which will be complex, confusing and 
unjust to others’.6
 
4.3 Two cases, two approaches 
In the leading Australian High Court 
case of R v O’Connor (1980) 29 ALR 
449 Barwick CJ reviewed the 
arguments on both sides of the debate 
and asked whether a departure from 
common law principles was justified to 
protect society from what he called 
‘intoxicated violence’. His answer, 
which was in the majority, was that 
such a departure was not justified. The 
rationale for the admission of 
intoxication evidence was explained by 
Barwick CJ in the following terms: 
 
Now there can be little doubt that as 
of this time an accused in a state of 
intoxication which has rendered his 
acts involuntary or precluded the 
formation of relevant intent…could 
not be guilty of any common law 
offence. What his body had done, he 
had not done, or what he had done 
had not been done with intent to do 
it.7
 
Barwick CJ concluded: 
 
It seems to me to be completely 
inconsistent with the principles of the 
common law that a man should be 
conclusively presumed to have an 
intent which, in fact, he does not 
have, or to have done an act which, 
in truth, he did not do.8
 
In O’Connor therefore the High Court 
upheld the principles of the common 
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law by deciding that evidence of self-
induced intoxication (either by alcohol 
or drugs, or both) is relevant in relation 
to any criminal offence to determine 
whether a defendant acted voluntarily 
or intentionally. 
 
In arriving at this conclusion, the High 
Court rejected the alternative approach 
taken by the House of Lords in Reg v 
Majewski [1977] AC 443. Majewski 
was a case concerned with charges of 
assault occasioning actual bodily 
harm, and assault on a police officer in 
the execution of his duty. The House 
of Lords was unanimous in concluding 
that even though the defendant was 
intoxicated he could be convicted of 
the assault. A distinction was made 
between crimes of basic and specific 
intent and it was decided that self-
induced intoxication is only relevant to 
the proof of a crime of specific intent. 
The decision in Majewski’s case was 
based on principles of public policy, 
notably: (1) that the law should provide 
protection against unprovoked violent 
conduct of intoxicated offenders; and 
(2) that it is morally just to hold 
intoxicated offenders responsible for 
criminal conduct, given that they freely 
chose to become intoxicated. 
 
4.4 Basic intent and specific intent 
The distinction between crimes of 
basic and specific intent is a difficult 
one. In summary, in offences of basic 
intent the only relevant intent is to do 
the physical act which is required as 
part of the actus reus, whereas in 
offences of specific intent an intention 
to cause a specific result is an 
element. In the Second Reading 
speech for the Criminal Legislation 
Further Amendment Act of 1995 the 
distinction was explained as follows: 
 
An offence of basic intent is an 
offence which simply requires an 
intention to perform some act - such 
as striking a person - rather than 
one requiring an intention to bring 
about some consequences, such as 
striking a person with intent to cause 
grievous bodily harm. An offence of 
specific intent is thus one involving 
an additional purposive element, 
that is, a specific purpose or an 
intention to achieve a particular 
result. Murder is such an offence. It 
requires proof that the accused 
acted with an intention to kill or inflict 
grievous bodily harm. By contrast, 
an offence of basic intent requires 
proof only that the accused intended 
to commit the act proscribed. 
Manslaughter is such an offence. It 
requires proof only that the accused 
committed an unlawful or dangerous 
act.9
 
An example of an offence of basic 
intent is the offence of common 
assault under s 61 of the Crimes Act 
1900. 
 
4.5 Intoxication and criminal 
responsibility in NSW 
In NSW the law relating to self-induced 
intoxication was changed by the 
Criminal Legislation Further 
Amendment Act of 1995. Basically, 
reform was away from the common 
law position reflected in O’Connor and 
towards that found in Majewski. It was 
explained in the relevant Second 
Reading speech that: 
 
The preference for the Majewski 
approach is based on important 
public policy considerations. The 
Standing Committee of Attorneys-
General, in particular, took the view 
that to excuse otherwise criminal 
conduct in relation to simple 
offences of basic intent - such as 
assault - because the accused is 
intoxicated to such an extent, is 
totally unacceptable at a time when 
alcohol and drug abuse are such 
significant social problems. The 
standing committee considered that 
if a person voluntarily takes the risk 
of getting intoxicated then he or she 
should be responsible for his or her 
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actions. This Government agrees 
with and strongly supports this 
approach. The proposed 
amendments therefore essentially 
reflect the approach taken in 
Majewski, as well as that taken by 
the Commonwealth Criminal Code 
Act 1995, which enacts the 
principles of the model criminal 
code.10
 
4.6 Part 11A of the Crimes Act 
1900 
New Part 11A was inserted into the 
Crimes Act 1900 which applies to all 
offences committed since 16 August 
1996. 
 
Under this codified scheme, the 
common law relating to intoxication 
and criminal responsibility is abolished 
(s 428H). Adopted is the basic/specific 
intention distinction, as is a distinction 
between self-inflicted intoxication and 
intoxication that is not self-induced 
(involuntary intoxication). ‘Self-induced 
intoxication’ is defined as any form of 
intoxication except that which is: (a) 
involuntary; (b) results from fraud, 
sudden or extraordinary emergency, 
accident, reasonable mistake, duress 
or force, or (c) results from the 
appropriate administration of a 
prescription or non-prescription drug (s 
428A). The relevant Second Reading 
speech explained: 
 
The intoxication must be self-
induced. Clearly it would be unfair 
for intoxication to be disregarded 
where a person becomes intoxicated 
due to fraud, reasonable mistake, 
duress or force. For example, it 
would be unfair not to allow 
evidence of intoxication to be 
considered where a person may 
unknowingly have had his or her 
drinks spiked.11
 
By s 428G(1), which is headed 
‘Intoxication and the actus reus of an 
offence’, evidence of self-induced 
intoxication cannot be taken into 
account in determining whether the 
accused acted voluntarily. This applies 
for all categories of offences, of basic 
and specific intent. Involuntary 
intoxication, on the other hand, can be 
taken into account for this purpose (s 
428G(2)).  
 
By s 428D, evidence of self-induced 
intoxication cannot be taken into 
account in determining whether the 
accused had the mens rea for an 
offence of basic intent. Again, this 
exclusionary rule does not apply to 
involuntary intoxication. 
 
An offence of specific intent is defined 
in s 428B(1) as an ‘offence of which an 
intention to cause a specific result is 
an element’.12 By s 428C the 
relevance and admissibility of self-
induced intoxication is restricted to the 
mens rea for offences of specific 
intent. Self-induced intoxication may 
be taken into account in determining 
whether the person had the intention 
to cause the specific result necessary 
for an offence of specific intent. 
However, exceptions apply if the 
person (a) had resolved before 
becoming intoxicated to do the 
relevant conduct, or (b) became 
intoxicated in order to strengthen his or 
her resolve to do the relevant conduct. 
 
Section 428B(2) sets out in table form 
non-exhaustive examples of the 
offences of specific intent found in the 
Crimes Act 1900. These include: 
murder (s 19A); wounding or grievous 
bodily harm with intent (s 33); assault 
with intent to have sexual intercourse 
(s 61K); and entering dwelling house 
(s 111). A second table sets out those 
provisions where an element of the 
offence requires a person to intend to 
cause the specific result necessary for 
the offence. One example is the 
offence of ‘assault with intent to rob 
person’ (s 94). By s 428B(c) there is 
also a regulation making power to 
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include as an offence of specific intent, 
‘any other offence by or under any law 
(including the common law) prescribed 
by the regulations’. 
 
By s 428E special provision is made 
for murder and manslaughter. If 
evidence of intoxication at the time of 
the relevant conduct results in a 
person being acquitted of murder, 
then, in the case of self-induced 
intoxication, evidence of that 
intoxication cannot be taken into 
account in determining whether the 
accused had the requisite mens rea for 
manslaughter. In the case of 
intoxication that was not self-induced, 
evidence of that intoxication may be 
taken into account in determining 
whether the person had the requisite 
mens rea for manslaughter 
 
Section 428F is headed ‘Intoxication in 
relation to the reasonable adult test’. It 
provides that where, for the purposes 
of determining whether a person is 
guilty of an offence, it is necessary to 
compare the state of mind of the 
accused with that of a reasonable 
person, the comparison is to be made 
between the conduct or state of mind 
of the accused and that of a 
reasonable person who is not 
intoxicated. The Criminal Trial Courts 
Bench Book comments: 
 
This provision would be relevant 
when the court was dealing, for 
example, with a charge of 
manslaughter by an unlawful and 
dangerous act or manslaughter by 
criminal negligence.13
 
4.7 Part 11A applied 
An example of the application of Part 
11A in a case of self-induced 
intoxication and specific intent is  
R v Makisi [2004] NSWCCA 333  
 
A more recent example is 
Bellchambers v R [2008] NSWCCA 
235  
 
4.8 Comments on Part 11A 
The Victorian Parliament’s Law 
Reform Committee, which reported in 
1999 in support of retaining the 
common law position on intoxication, 
made a number of critical observations 
in relation to Part 11A of the NSW 
Crimes Act 1900. These included:14
 
• The evidence taken by the 
Committee is that evidence of 
self-induced intoxication is not 
raised very often because it is 
extremely difficult to establish 
that a defendant was so 
intoxicated that he or she was 
unable to form any intent. 
• Part 11A is based on the ability 
to distinguish between offences 
of specific and basic intent. 
While examples of offences of 
specific intent are provided, the 
list is not exhaustive leaving the 
courts with the responsibility of 
determining the nature of 
offences not included in the 
legislation. This is not an easy 
task because the distinction 
between offences of basic and 
specific intent is artificial, 
unclear and arbitrary. There is 
also the criticism that where an 
offence of basic intent is 
involved, a defendant is 
imputed with an intention which 
he or she does not in fact 
possess. 
 
5 Suggested reforms 
 
As noted, it is reported that the 
Government intends to ‘remove 
intoxication as a defence or a 
mitigating factor in crime – particularly 
assaults’. Instead, drunkenness would 
become an ‘aggravating factor’ in 
sentencing’. Note that neither common 
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assault (s 61) nor the offence of 
assault occasioning actual bodily harm 
(s 59) are offences of specific intent. 
Evidence of self-induced intoxication is 
not admissible therefore in these 
cases for the determination of a 
person’s guilt or non-guilt. As 
explained, self-induced intoxication 
may still be relevant in such cases, as 
a mitigating or aggravating factor, for 
sentencing purposes. Presumably, it is 
to this issue that the suggested reform 
looks. Self-induced intoxication could, 
for example, be included as an 
aggravating factor under s 21A(2) of 
the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) 
Act 1999. Alternatively, it could be 
made an aggravating factor for specific 
assault offences under the Crimes Act 
1900. 
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